O ne of the key geopolitical developments of the past two decades has been the transformation of the Indo-U.S. relationship from estrangement to strategic partnership. The most commonly held explanation for this development is a changing alignment of interests.
1 Indeed, ahead of a visit with President Donald Trump in June 2017, Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared that he was "confident in the growing convergence between our two nations. "
2 The idea that India and the United States are moving closer together has been repeated in a number of official statements and echoed by foreign policy analysts.
3 Yet skeptics suggest there are glaring differences between the two sides and that when it comes to foreign policy preferences, India is no closer to the United States than is Russia or China. 4 This divergence of views raises a number of questions about the state of the Indo-U.S. relationship. When it comes to geopolitical developments in Asia, do U.S. and Indian interests align? In which regions and with which set of countries do the policy priorities of the two states converge and where do differences remain? Where convergences of interest exist, are there indications that the two countries are actively working together? Finally, how is their bilateral partnership perceived by other regional states? This special issue of Asia Policy examines the ability of India and the United States to cooperate and manage their differences in a variety of regions in the Indo-Pacific.
To set the stage for this discussion, this introductory essay begins by exploring the concept of strategic partnership and assesses the prospects for such partners to cooperate in a third country or region. As we shall argue, peacetime foreign policy cooperation between major powers is a rarity. At the same time, however, China's rapid rise in the international system has forced the United States and India to consult more closely in an unprecedented manner. Next, the essay introduces the articles in this special issue, which focus on the history of Indo-U.S. collaboration and the prospects for future 1 Teresita C. Schaffer, "Security Ties, " in "India-U.S. Relations in Transition, " ed. Dhruva Jaishankar, Brookings India, June 2016, 11. cooperation in different subregions of Asia. By examining Indian and U.S. policies toward third countries-some friends, some not-the authors challenge misperceptions and misunderstandings of each country's policies and past behavior as well as identify the differing understandings of both the bilateral relationship and the region held by each party. Taken together, these articles provide a clearer sense of the geopolitical scope and depth, as well as the important limitations, of the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership. This introductory essay concludes by offering some thoughts on the key insights from this collection and the overall trajectory of U.S.-India relations.
strategic partnerships in the 21st century
It is an exaggeration to say that alliances have become passé in the post-Cold War world, but among the major powers "strategic partnerships" now appear to be the preferred means of forming important bilateral relationships in the 21st century.
5 Terming a relationship a strategic partnership generally indicates a desire for a more significant level of bilateral engagement than would occur through regular diplomatic interaction.
6 The prospect of realizing mutually beneficial economic opportunities or reacting to shared security challenges-in a manner that may not be possible alone-is frequently the objective of enhancing the relationship.
7 Since the focus is on maximizing shared gains in specific areas, strategic partnerships can exist between states whose interests are largely aligned, as well as between those whose relations are characterized by a mix of cooperation and competition.
8 Countries forming strategic partnerships are clearly not antagonists, but they do not necessarily have to be close friends. Consequently, their interests may overlap and diverge depending on the issue at hand.
9 As François Godement notes, the use of the term "strategic" to describe a partnership refers more to "the absence of divisive issues than to a joint strategy in the traditional sense. "
10
Glenn Snyder defines alliances as "formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership."
11 Scholars who study strategic partnerships differentiate them from alliances on several grounds. First, strategic partnerships are seen to focus on the achievement of specific objectives that are "positive" goals, rather than having a "negative" focus on deterring or opposing a hostile state. Whereas alliances are often-though not always-targeted against a specific threat, strategic partnerships do not necessarily identify a particular enemy.
12 Arguably, one of the main reasons these types of relationships have proliferated since the end of the Cold War is the fact that a lack of clarity as to the source of the next major security challenge makes more flexible partnerships preferable to formal commitments.
13 At the same time, the ambiguity surrounding strategic partnerships may also avoid provoking a countervailing response from countries that feel implicitly targeted by the relationship in the way that a military alliance might. Unlike alliances, which have formal commitments and can require binding responses by parties to specific events, strategic partnerships involve a much lower level of commitment. Whereas the cost of entry into an alliance is the loss of a degree of autonomy and freedom of action, the informality of strategic partnerships places far fewer constraints on states' independence.
14 In a similar vein, the lack of concrete commitments to the other party makes the entry and exit costs of partnerships much lower than formal alliances. Thus, a strategic partnership is far less than an alliance and the existence of a strategic partnership does not necessarily indicate an intent to form an alliance in the future.
15
As a result of the nebulousness of strategic partnerships, they tend to be open-ended relationships. As long as the collaboration facilitates the achievement of both individual objectives and shared goals for the states involved, they could persist indefinitely. Consequently, as Thomas Wilkins argues, the durability of strategic partnerships is a product of the degree of alignment between the values and interests of the two partners.
16
In terms of diplomatic practice, two countries forging a strategic partnership seek to establish regular summits between their political and military leaderships, tone down conflicts in favor of cooperation on issues of mutual interest, and generally work to encourage a long-standing economic and political relationship.
17 In other words, the two sides seek to advance their shared interests in specific areas while enabling future cooperation by establishing procedures to cope with disagreements when differing interests come to the fore.
18 Process is often a key focus of bureaucratic efforts between partner states. Thus, strategic partnerships, in Colleen Chidley's words, are "formed in pursuit of cooperation, for the purpose of cooperation. "
19
Repeated interactions between pairs of states can increase trust and diminish uncertainty, which in turn reduces the cost of future bilateral cooperation.
Interstate cooperation can be conceived of in two general ways. The more expansive way of understanding cooperation-particularly between major powers-is the mutual acceptance of outcomes, rules, and constraints that result from repeated interactions between pairs of states.
20 Though real, the achievement of such tacit cooperation is not necessarily the explicit aim of either side. Indeed, such forms of cooperation often result, in Edward Kolodziej's phraseology, from the "grudging crystallization of compromises" that occurs when each state realizes that it cannot dictate terms to the other or achieve its entire range of objectives in a given situation.
21 Much of the "cooperation" that occurred between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, for example, was of this type. A second, narrower conception of cooperation, and the one adopted in this series of articles, focuses on the similarity between the two states in terms of both objectives being sought and strategies to achieve them. This latter type of cooperation is 16 Wilkins, "Japan's Alliance Diversification, " 126. far less common in international politics, at least when it comes to relations between great powers.
22
The existence of common interests between pairs of states is rarely enough on its own to engender cooperation. Commitment problems, lack of information about a partner's true intentions, and the incentives states have to misrepresent themselves are just a few of the obstacles to mutually beneficial cooperation.
23 Even if states could transcend these complications, cooperation may still be rebuffed because the parties are unhappy with the way the benefits of collaboration are distributed.
24 Although the two sides may gain in absolute terms from bilateral cooperation, the fact that one of the two gains relatively more may be enough to scupper any deal entirely. 25 The question as to whether states are more concerned with absolute or relative gains, and the likelihood of cooperation that this implied, was a key component of the classic paradigmatic debate between neorealists and neoliberals in international relations.
26 The two theoretical traditions reached a point of convergence in the recognition that when security concerns dominate international politics, states will be more attuned to relative gains, rendering cooperation more difficult, but in a more benign environment a focus on absolute gains, and thus international cooperation, is possible.
27
The expectation that states find it easier to cooperate in the economic sphere than the security domain is borne out by experience.
28 Even the most successful wartime military alliance of the twentieth century, that of the Allied powers against Nazi Germany and imperial Japan, was riven by differences over both aims and the strategies to achieve them. As the eventual unfolding of the Cold War demonstrated, theirs was not a cooperation underpinned by shared values and objectives. Even in the face of a powerful military threat, it was difficult to transcend interstate differences and sustain cooperation. Cooperation between major powers becomes still more difficult when the domain of action is not on one's border but abroad in a third region. During the Cold War, the United States was able to get some of its allies-notably Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and South Korea-to contribute to the war in Vietnam, but other traditional partners such as the United Kingdom and Canada resisted involvement. After 1991, cooperative military interventions become more commonplace as the United States led, or contributed to, operations in Iraq, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. These operations involved participation-real or symbolic-from a number of different countries and organizations, including NATO. Yet the challenges of reconciling differing priorities and preferences that affected the Grand Alliance in World War II remain. To take but one example, in the 1999 Kosovo War, leading European NATO countries and the United States had markedly different positions on the escalation of air strikes against Serbia, targeting of dual-use infrastructure, and potential deployment of ground forces.
30 The disputes among allies grew so contentious that at one point the Italian foreign minister warned that his country might leave NATO.
31
Why would extraregional powers cooperate in a different part of the world? There are three main motives for this type of cooperation. First, they could jointly resist a third, nonresident great power that they feel threatens the region. This might be seen in the various British and U.S. efforts to establish regional defense pacts in the Middle East during the Cold War to deter perceived Soviet aggression.
32 A second motivation could be to work against a hostile regime in the region that threatens stability or the local balance of power. The U.S.-led multilateral coalition that came together in 1990 to counter Iraq's annexation of Kuwait is emblematic of this type of purpose. A third motive for cooperative engagement could be to contain a regional crisis that has the potential to escalate. U.S. and British diplomatic efforts, among others, for example, are credited with helping prevent the outbreak of armed conflict between India and Pakistan in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks on the Indian parliament. If wartime cooperation is challenging, peacetime cooperation among major powers in third countries is a rarity. This is because, in the absence of war, differing national interests are more likely to dominate decision-making. Thus, episodes that appear superficially to be cooperative, such as U.S. and British efforts to establish a defensive perimeter in the Middle East during the 1950s, contain significant elements of rivalry under the surface.
34 If it is difficult enough for two allies to cooperate in this manner, the difficulty only increases when the countries are not even in a formal alliance relationship.
The looser ties that characterize strategic partnerships make collaboration complicated as the roles of "leader" and "follower" are not clearly defined in the relationship. Moreover, because the strength of the ties between the states is so ambiguous, it is rarely apparent how countries in a strategic partnership will behave when faced with common threats and challenges. Despite their increasing ubiquity, academic discussion of strategic partnerships and foreign policy remains limited. Under what conditions do strategic partners sharing similar interests cooperate? What forms does this cooperation take, and if it does not occur, why not? What are the sources of change either facilitating or hindering such cooperation? The articles in this special issue examine these questions in the context of the U.S.-India strategic partnership and assess distinct aspects of U.S.-India relations in various subregions of Asia, as well as their bilateral defense relationship.
the united states and india: difficult partners Despite being two large democracies-or perhaps because of it-the United States and India have not traditionally had an easy relationship. During the Cold War, they were divided in their approach to both regional and global developments.
35 At times these differences were magnified by each side's sense of being an exceptional, exemplary state in the international system. interests that did exist. 37 Since the early 1990s, however, the two countries have found greater freedom to maneuver in the international system and successive governments in both states have worked to forge a robust partnership.
38 This transformation has become evident over the last fifteen years as a once tense bilateral relationship metamorphosed into a strategic partnership, complete with close defense ties, frequent joint military exercises, and a civil-nuclear deal that accommodated India into the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. The benefits to both countries from this development are significant. India obtained access to technology and economic assistance to facilitate its rise, while the United States gained the friendship of an emerging democratic partner.
39
Although diplomats in both countries may deny it, the U.S.-India bilateral relationship has also taken on greater urgency because of the rise of China.
China's emergence as an economic and military power has brought about systemic and regional challenges. At the systemic level, China's economic growth over the last decade has placed it as the closest peer competitor to the United States.
40 A number of Chinese schemes, including island building in the disputed South China Sea, the Belt and Road Initiative, and the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, are perceived in some quarters as challenges to the U.S.-led global order.
At a regional level, the rise of China has created new dynamics in different subregions of Asia, including Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia. The dominant power or powers in each of these regions are dealing with China's rise based on their own bilateral relations with China, the United States, and other key states in the region. India, the leading power in South Asia, has responded with a combination of accommodation and balancing. Like other countries acknowledging China's growing economic interests and capabilities, India has tried to accommodate some aspects of Beijing's expanding foreign policy remit and sought to keep bilateral relations on an even keel. For example, New Delhi has begrudgingly accepted that China will have interests in India's immediate 
neighborhood.
41 India also clearly sought to reduce bilateral tensions in the wake of the 2017 Doklam standoff on the China-India border via a private meeting between President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Wuhan.
In terms of balancing, India has attempted to undertake extensive military modernization and infrastructure development along the border. Indicative of this, the Indian armed forces are increasingly focused on the threat posed by China and have adjusted their military strategy accordingly.
42
The most important element of external balancing undertaken by India has been the transformation of its relationship and wide-ranging engagement with the United States. 43 This transformation has been neither easy nor assured. Although attitudes toward the United States are mostly positive across the Indian population as a whole, anti-Americanism still retains some currency among opposition parties and foreign policy elites. 44 In many respects, this reflects a generation that came of age during the estrangement of the Cold War and has failed to update its ideological outlook. 45 Nevertheless, such actors have the concrete ability to retard cooperation such that a simple logistics agreement of the type that the United States has with more than a hundred countries took over ten years to negotiate with India. Even then, in ratifying such an accord, opposition parties and foreign affairs commentators in India accused Prime Minister Modi of surrendering the country's independence. 46 Closer ties with the United States, especially on the terms that Americans are used to, do not fit well with India's traditional preference for strategic autonomy. This desire for an independent foreign policy explains the preponderance of strategic partnerships in India's foreign policy discourse but its abhorrence of alliances.
47 Not all of New Delhi's strategic partnerships are equal, however, and undoubtedly, the partnership with Washington is the most consequential. outline of articles Constantino Xavier's article examines U.S.-India engagement in India's immediate neighborhood with a focus on their historical and contemporary interactions mainly in Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar. As is discussed in more detail in the article, U.S.-India relations vis-à-vis Pakistan were deliberately not addressed because the topic dominates extant literature on Indo-U.S. ties, often at the expense of the smaller nations of South Asia examined here. Xavier argues that with China's gradual emergence as a South Asian actor, India is increasingly willing to join forces with outside powers to pursue shared objectives in a region typically seen as its exclusive sphere of influence. This opens a window of opportunity for greater U.S.-India convergence in South Asia, a pivotal region in their joint strategic vision for the Indo-Pacific. While in the past New Delhi's and Washington's policies toward the region's third countries have often coexisted, they are now more willing to join efforts to coordinate and cooperate across South Asia and the Bay of Bengal region. With reference to case studies of Indo-U.S. interactions in Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar ranging from the 1950s to the 2000s, Xavier dispels assumptions about constant conflict and instead identifies a range of constructive engagements between U.S. and Indian officials. Based on these patterns, he argues that these past dynamics can pave the way for a more sustained and closer Indo-U.S. engagement and offers concrete recommendations on how to deepen communication, coordination, and cooperation between the two partners in and around the subcontinent.
Our article for this special issue examines U.S. and Indian policies toward Southeast Asia, a region characterized by a congruence of interests between Washington and New Delhi. We argue that there have been extensive diplomatic consultations, leading to a significant convergence in policy statements; however, substantive collaboration between the United States and India in Southeast Asia is constrained by several factors: India's requirement to prioritize foreign policy challenges in South Asia, a fear of provoking China, an institutional mismatch in the foreign and security policy bureaucracies of the two countries, and the possibility of an adverse reaction from countries in the region. Consequently, while offering recommendations for enhancing cooperation, we conclude that, for the time being, Washington and New Delhi will probably work in parallel rather than actively coordinate these regional efforts.
Sinderpal Singh's article examines the perceptions of India and the United States regarding the Indo-Pacific region and assesses the extent of their strategic convergence and cooperation. He argues that overly optimistic assessments of the Indo-Pacific as an area of cooperation between Washington and New Delhi neglect several significant divergences between the two states. Fundamentally, India and the United States have differing geographic conceptions of the "Indo-Pacific, " which has important implications for broader strategic convergence. Moreover, bilateral coordination of military and diplomatic policies in the region in response to China's rise is likely to be constrained by different positions on a number of key issues.
Sumitha Narayanan Kutty's article focuses on a contemporary challenge that has been a cause of much anxiety in both capitals: Iran. Based on field research and interviews, she dispels the myth that policy differences over Iran are a major impediment to the bilateral relationship. Instead, both India and the United States are accommodative of each other's strategic interests and take the long view when dealing with their differences to avoid major disruptions in ties. They do so through direct, private negotiations at the highest levels of leadership and downplay their disagreements in public. As a regional power with global aspirations, India is willing to adapt and absorb certain costs, such as the U.S. sanctions against Iranian oil imports in 2012 and 2018, in return for U.S. accommodation of its own priorities such as completion of the Chabahar port project.
48 As India and the United States expand their consultations on the Middle East, the article recommends leveraging differences and identifying complementary strengths that would prove useful to counter China's growing economic and security presence in this region.
Finally, Cara Abercrombie's article focuses squarely on the future of the U.S.-India partnership and draws on the author's personal experience managing the India portfolio at various levels for the U.S. Department of Defense over the past decade. She argues that although the defense and security dimension of the strategic partnership has demonstrated significant growth and progress in recent years, it lacks the elements of a mature partnership that are critical to enabling the type of cooperation envisioned. The two countries have not developed the "habits of cooperation" that the United States typically enjoys with its closest partners. This is not entirely surprising because India's security partnership with the United States presents a departure from its traditional security partnerships. New Delhi 48 The United States granted an exemption to India from sanctions for the development of Chabahar port. Yashwant Raj, "U.S. Exempts India from Sanctions at Chabahar Port in Iran, " Hindustan Times, November 7, 2018 u https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/us-exempts-india-fromsanctions-at-chabahar-port-in-iran/story-KsoiFfwuvjw18mB9Q2wjqJ.html.
is still learning how to cooperate deeply with a foreign counterpart across a broad security agenda. In turn, the United States is also learning how to adapt its established patterns of bilateral cooperation to a model that is acceptable to India. Abercrombie argues that, with additional effort, the United States and India can habituate regular cooperation and realize the full potential of their partnership.
conclusion: the future of u.s.
-india relations
What are some of the key insights from this special issue? First, as several of the articles observe, despite a seeming congruence of interests between the two sides, sustaining and developing U.S.-India relations will require considerable attention and imagination in both countries. For some, stronger defense ties-epitomized by the recent signing of the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement and the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement-are indicative of a stable and secure strategic partnership. As our authors point out, however, sustaining this relationship requires high-level political and diplomatic attention. Indeed, at the time of this writing, diplomats in both countries are engaged in damage control arising from India's $5 billion agreement to purchase the S-400 air defense system from Russia, which may lead to sanctions under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. This follows on earlier disagreements over Iran policy and contentions over trade liberalization and U.S. visas for highly skilled Indian workers that at times have overshadowed the positive developments in the relationship. Given that there are a range of issues on which New Delhi and Washington do not necessarily see eye to eye, sustained political attention and imagination are essential to ensure that the United States and India do not drift apart by accident. Iran, as well as further into Afghanistan and Central Asia. To a significant extent, China's inroads into different subregions of Asia have been facilitated by its promise to improve infrastructure under the controversial Belt and Road Initiative. To address Asia's growing demand for infrastructure, India, the United States, Japan, and even the European Union have all unveiled their respective versions of a "connectivity strategy, " but much more remains to be done. 50 Washington and New Delhi need to engage in a serious discussion of their connectivity plans and strategies, which at some stage may also include like-minded parties such as Japan, Australia, and the EU.
Finally, this special issue highlights the need for constant communication between officials in both countries. India and the United States increasingly share a similar set of objectives in Asia. When disagreements occur, they are more often about means than ends. Nevertheless, as Xavier cogently points out in his article, bilateral cooperation is "hindered by the absence of dialogue." The initial 2+2 meeting held in New Delhi in September 2018 was a positive step, but more engagement is necessary across different bureaucracies. For instance, if the United States and India were to more closely consult about developments in South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean littoral, or the Middle East to help mitigate differences in regional policy, it would require direct conversations between the desk officers in the State and Defense Departments of both countries-by no means an easy task. Such consultations can, of course, also be expanded to include like-minded partners sharing similar regional interests. Creating a web of relationships and dialogue mechanisms is necessary to build trust-the cornerstone of any relationship, strategic or otherwise.
Notwithstanding the obstacles identified in these articles, the overall geopolitical trend lines are clear: the United States and India are coming together and slowly and erratically learning to cooperate with each other. Despite the uncertainty surrounding President Trump's foreign policy, there are encouraging signs that his administration is willing to work with India-even on areas of disagreement such as Iran and Russia. 51 The articles in this special issue identify both the potential and the limits of an Asian, if 50 To its credit, the Trump administration has set aside funds for an "Indo-Pacific economic vision. " See Michael R. Pompeo, "Remarks on "America's Indo-Pacific Economic Vision" (speech at the U.S. 
